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Abstract
We characterize the monetary competitive equilibrium in a two-country mon-
etary union model involving cash-in-advance constraints both in the factor mar-
kets and in the good markets. Simulations show that common money inflation in
the union have asymmetric effects on the welfare of workers in the two countries
which are technologically differentiated. We also find that the distribution of the
money stock within the union may affect labor flow across the countries.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the effects of monetary policy on the flow and welfare of labor within
an open-economy monetary union facing liquidity constraints. In closed economy mod-
els, implications of cash-in-advance constraints in production and/or investment expenses
on equilibrium were successfully studied, for example, by Stockman (1980), Grossman and
Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984). Their applications to the business cycles literature
have also been considerably successful (Fuerst, 1992, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans,
1997, 1998). However, the literature that incorporates liquidity constraints into open econ-
omy models is quite thin. Amongst the notable studies, the one by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1999) considers a small open economy operating with fiat money to deal with the issues of
optimal money inflation and the indeterminacy of equilibria. Arseneau (2004) investigates
the optimal inflation in a two-country open economy with imperfect competition.
Unlike the previous literature, we integrate in this paper the open economy framework
with cash-in-advance models allowing for factor trade between countries. Our model that
partially borrows from the closed economy models of Basci and Saglam (1999, 2003, 2005)
considers a two-country monetary union with a common central bank. We assume that
there are infinitely-lived representative workers and producers in each country. Workers own
labor endowments which are perfectly mobile between countries whereas producers have
constant returns to scale technologies in each time period. Countries are asymmetric with
respect to their production technologies. Using labor as the single factor of production, each
country produces a single good, which is sold (at different prices) and consumed in both
countries. We assume that in each country the labor market opens before the good market
and all transactions occur by the common currency of the union. The common central bank
determines the uniform money growth rate, while the implied money supply in each country
is controlled through money transfers to - or taxes on - producers. In each period, producers
derive utility from the consumption of the two goods whereas workers receive utility from
both consumption and leisure.
We characterize the monetary competitive equilibrium in the described monetary union
model and run some computer simulations to analyze the effects of the distribution and the
rate of growth of the aggregate money stock in the monetary union on the welfare and flow
of labor.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the
characterization of the monetary competitive equilibrium and simulation results. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Structures
2.1.1 Monetary Union
We consider a monetary union involving two countries, denoted by h and f . Countries are
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indexed by j. The unionized economy operates with fiat money. By mjt we denote the
aggregate money stock in country j at the end of period t. We assume that mj
0
is given,
and money stock evolves over time according to mjt+1 = (1 + α)m
j
t , where α is the common
growth rate of money in the union.
2.1.2 Workers and Producers
Each country is populated with two types of agents, workers, w, and producers, p. Agents
are indexed by i. All agents live for infinite periods. There is no population growth. In
every time period, the numbers of workers and producers in country j are denoted by nwj
and npj, respectively.
Workers in country j have constant labor endowments, l¯wj, in each period of their lives.
They value leisure in units of the consumption goods through the function vwj(x, y) =
ln(x+ δj) − ρjy, which is increasing in its first argument, the leisure, and decreasing in its
second argument, the labor supplied in the neighboring country. We assume that ρf > ρh
and δh, δf > 1 to ensure that labor asymmetrically flows from country h to country f in
equilibrium.
Producers in country j have no labor endowments; instead they own a constant returns
to scale production technology, f pj(x) = ηjx with ηj > 0 to convert any labor, x ≥ 0, into a
country-specific good, called good j, which is consumed in the whole union. We assume that
the technology in country f is more productive, i.e. ηf > ηh. (For notational convenience,
we also introduce l¯pj = 0, fwj(x) = 0, and vp,j(x, y) = 0 for all j and for all nonnegative x
and y.)
Each agent i in country j has the life-time utility
W ij =
∞∑
t=0
(β ij)t[ γij ln(cijjt ) + (1− γ
ij) ln(cijkt ) + v
ij(l¯ij + lijjt + l
ijk
t , l
ijk
t )]
for k = {h, f} \ {j} and βij, γij ∈ (0, 1). Here, cijrt denotes consumption of each agent
i ∈ {w, p} in country j ∈ {h, f} of good r ∈ {h, f} and lijrt denotes labor demand (supply if
negative) of each agent i ∈ {w, p} from country j ∈ {h, f} in country r ∈ {h, f}.
2.1.3 Money Transfers
The common central bank changes the money stock in the union through lump-sum trans-
fers/taxes at the beginning of each period. Each agent i in country j enters period t with
the end of period t− 1 cash balance mijt−1. While no worker gets money transfer during her
lifetime (xwjt = 0, for all t), each producer receives x
pj
t = (1 + α)m
j
t−1/n
pj units of money
transfer at the beginning of period t.
2.2 Transactions
The timing of transactions is as follows: We assume that the labor market opens before the
good market in each country. Each type i agent in country j starts period t with the money
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balance mijt−1+x
ij
t that is equal to the sum of the balance carried from the end of period t−1
and money transfers/taxes. Then labor markets open simultaneously. Factor trades take
place at the nominal wage rates wht and w
f
t in countries h and f , respectively, and all wage
bills are paid in advance of production. Production of country-j good occurs with the labor
lpjht and l
pjf
t that producers in country j employ from countries h and f , respectively. Good
markets open simultaneously. Transactions are made by cash at the price pjkt for j, k ∈ {h, f}.
The end-of-period cash balances realize asmijt = m
ij
t−1+x
ij
t −w
j
t l
ijj
t −w
k
t l
ijk
t −p
jj
t q
ijj
t −p
jk
t q
ijk
t ,
where k = {h, f} \ {j}, and qijrt denotes commodity demand (supply if negative) of each
agent i ∈ {w, p} from country j ∈ {h, f} for (of) good r ∈ {h, f}.
2.3 Agents’ Problems
The representative agent of type i in country j faces the following maximization problem given
her life time endowment structure, l¯ij, and strictly positive prices {wht , w
f
t , p
hh
t , p
hf
t , p
fh
t , p
ff
t }:
max
∞∑
t=0
(β ij)t[ γij ln(cijjt ) + (1− γ
ij) ln(cijkt ) + v
ij(l¯ij + lijjt + l
ijk
t , l
ijk
t )], k = j
subject to:
mijt = m
ij
t−1 + x
ij
t − w
h
t l
ijh
t − w
f
t l
ijf
t − p
jh
t q
ijh
t − p
jf
t q
ijf
t (1)
−l¯ij ≤ lijht + l
ijf
t ≤ (m
ij
t−1 + x
ij
t )/w
j
t (2)
cijjt = q
ijj
t + f
ij(l¯ij + lijht + l
ijf
t ) (3)
cijkt = q
ijk
t , k = j (4)
−pijt f
ij(l¯ij + lijt ) ≤ p
jh
t q
ijh
t + p
jf
t q
ijf
t ≤ m
ij
t−1 + x
ij
t − w
h
t l
ijh
t − w
f
t l
ijf
t (5)
Equation (1) describes end-of-period cash holdings. Constraint (2) must be read as that in
each period supply of labor is bounded from above by labor endowments of workers whereas
demand for labor is constrained by the amount of cash with which producers enter the factor
market. Constraints (3) and (4) state that consumption of each agent equals the sum of her
production (if any) net of sales. Constraint (5) imposes technology and liquidity constraints
in the goods market.
2.4 Monetary Competitive Equilibrium
We are now ready to define our equilibrium concept.
Definition 1. The list 〈wjt , p
jk
t , c
ijk
t , l
ijk
t , q
ijk
t ,m
ij
t | t ∈ {0, 1, ...∞}, i ∈ {w, p} and j, k ∈
{h, f}〉 is a Monetary Competitive Equilibrium (MCE) for the described economy if wjt , p
jh
t ,
pjft > 0 for all j, and
(i) 〈cijkt , l
ijk
t , q
ijk
t ,m
ij
t | k ∈ {h, f}〉 solves the maximization problem of each agent i in country
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j under the sequence {wht , w
f
t , p
jh
t , p
jf
t },
(ii) nwhlwhjt + n
wf lwfjt + n
phlphjt + n
pf lpfjt = 0,
(iii) nwhqwhjt + n
wfqwfjt + n
phqphjt + n
pfqpfjt = 0,
(iv) nwjmwjt + n
pjmpjt = m
j
t .
Condition (i) states that representative agents make optimal choices under perfect fore-
sight of future prices and price taking behaviour. Conditions (ii)-(vi) ensure the clearing of
the three markets.
3 Results
Below, we characterize the monetary competitive equilibrium of the described economy.
Proposition 1. Monetary Competitive Equilibrium 〈wjt , p
jk
t , c
ijk
t , l
ijk
t , q
ijk
t , m
ij
t | for t ∈
{0, 1, . . . ,∞}, i ∈ {w, p} and j, k ∈ {h, f}〉 exists if (vwf1 + v
wf
2 ) − (v
wf
1 w
h
t )/w
f
t < 0 and is
uniquely characterized by (6)-(20):
wjt
pjjt
= ηj (6)
wht
wft
=
lwhft
lwhft − ρ
h(l¯wh + lwhht + l
whf
t + δ
h)
(7)
wjt
pjjt
=
qwjjt
γwj(l¯wj + lwjht + l
wjf
t + δ
j)
(8)
pjjt
pjkt
=
γij
1− γij
qpjkt
qpjjt + η
j(lpjht + l
pjf
t )
, k = j (9)
pjjt
pjkt
=
γij
1− γij
qwjkt
qwjjt
, k = j (10)
qwjjt = −
γwj
pjjt
(wht l
wjh
t + w
f
t l
wjf
t ) (11)
qwjkt =
γwj − 1
pjkt
(wht l
wjh
t + w
f
t l
wjf
t ), k = j (12)
qpjjt = −
γpj
pjjt
mpjt + (1− γ
pj)ηj (13)
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qpjkt =
pjjt
pjkt
1− γpj
γpj
(qpjjt + η
j), k = j (14)
lpjjt =
mpjt−1 + x
pj
t
wjt
(15)
lwfht = 0 (16)
mwjt = 0 (17)
mpjt =
mjt
npj
(18)
cijjt = q
ijj
t + f
ij(l¯ij + lijht + l
ijf
t ) (19)
cijkt = q
ijk
t , k = j (20)
Proof. See Appendix.
An immediate remark about the characterized equilibrium is that the rate of money
growth has no effect on the real wage rate in any of the two countries, as observed from
equation (6). However, a further analytical (in)validation of a superneutrality result is not
possible, since there exists no closed-form solution for the other model variables. Thus, we
run simulations to uncover the real effects of money inflation in an artificial economy. The
values for the model parameters are listed in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Parameter Values
Utility from Consumption γwh = γwf = γph = γpf = 0.5
Utility from Leisure δh = δf = 1.2, ρh = 0.001, ρf = 0.002
Time Preference βwh = βwf = βph = βpf = 0.05
Labor Endowment l¯wh = l¯wf = 5
Productivity ηh = 1.5, ηf = 2
Population nwh = nwf = nph = npf = 1
Policy Variable α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}
For a symmetric distribution of the money stock in the union, with mh
0
= mf
0
= 50, we
observe no labor flow between the two countries. Each worker in country h supplies 88.4
percent of her labor endowment while the supply rate is only 62 percent for each worker in
6
country f , where the production technology is more efficient. We find that the labor in both
countries is supplied independently from the growth rate of money stock. However, money
inflation clearly affects the (relative) prices of the goods, hence the trade and consumption
of the goods within the union. Figure 1 shows that the prices of good h in the two countries
are increasing with the money growth rate, albeit at a much faster rate in contry h. (In the
below figures, superscripts of the relevant variables appear inside parantheses, while alpha
denotes α).
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Similarly, Figure 2 illustrates a positive relation between money inflation and the price
of good f in its country of production, pff . But the graph of price pfh of good f in country
h, as shown in the same figure, is clearly decreasing in the money growth rate. The posi-
tive relation between money inflation and the relative competitiveness of country-f good in
country h significantly affects the welfare of workers in the two countries through the channel
of good trades. Figure 3 establishes that with higher rates of money growth, the lifetime
utility of each worker becomes lower in country h, whereas higher in country f , where the
production technology is more efficient.
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When the distribution of the money stock within the union changes in favor of country
f , with mh0 = 40 and m
f
0 = 60, we have similar nominal effects as well as welfare effects of
money inflation, as exhibited in Figures 4-6. However, in the resulting equilibria we observe
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factor trades, as well. While each worker in country f remains to supply (still 62 percent of
her endowed) labor only to her domestic country, workers in country h now sell 7.4 percent
of their labor endowment to producers in country f , while 73 percent to producers in their
home country.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we characterize the monetary competitive equilibrium in a two-country mon-
etary union where agents face liquidity constraints both in the factor markets and in the
good markets. Our simulations show that the expansion of the money stock in the union
yields some real effects through the channel of the relative prices of the goods traded in the
two countries. In response to a rise in the common money growth rate within the union, the
welfare of each worker increases in the country where production is technologically superior
while it decreases in the rest of the union. We also establish that the distribution of the
total money stock may affect the factor trade within the union. A reduction in the share of
the money stock held by the technologically inferior country may lead to a partial flow of
its labor into the technologically superior country, while money inflation seems to have no
impacts on the labor flow and the domestic labor supply.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We will show that every MCE satisfies (6)-(20). Given the
problems of workers and producers in the two countries, we have the following first order
conditions:
First Order Conditions for Workers in Country j:
(βwj)tγU ′(qwjjt ) − λ
wj
t p
jj
t = 0 (21)
(βwj)t(1− γ)U ′(qwjkt )− λ
wj
t p
jk
t = 0, k = j (22)
(βwj)tvj1 − λ
wj
t w
j
t = 0 (23)
(βwj)t(vj1 + v
j
2)− λ
wj
t w
k
t
{
= 0 if j = h and k = f
< 0 if j = f and k = h
(24)
mwjt + p
jh
t q
wjh
t + p
jf
t q
wjf
t = −w
h
t l
wjh
t − w
f
t l
wjf
t +m
wj
t−1 (25)
First Order Conditions for Producers in Country j:
(βpj)tγU ′(qpjjt + f(l¯
pj + lpjht + l
pjf
t ))− λ
pj
t p
jj
t = 0 (26)
(βpj)t(1− γ)U ′(qpjkt )− λ
pj
t p
jk
t = 0, k = j (27)
(βpj)tγU ′(qpjjt + f(l¯
pj + lpjht + l
pjf
t ))f
′(l¯pj + lpjht + l
pjf
t )− λ
pj
t w
j
t = 0 (28)
mpjt + p
jh
t q
pjh
t + p
jf
t q
pjf
t = −w
h
t l
pjh
t − w
f
t l
pjf
t +m
pj
t−1 + x
pj
t (29)
In addition, we have the following market clearing conditions:
Labor Market Clearing Condition in Country j:
nwj(lwjjt ) + n
wk(lwkjt ) + n
pj(lpjjt ) = 0, k = j (30)
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Good Market Clearing Condition in Country j:
nwh(qwhjt ) + n
wf (qwfjt ) + n
ph(qphjt ) + n
pf (qpfjt ) = 0 (31)
Money Market Clearing Condition in Country j:
nwjmwjt + n
pjmpjt = m
j
t (32)
First note that the plans (6)-(20) satisfy aggregate feasibility (market clearing) conditions
(30)-(32). Moreover, they satisfy all individual feasibility conditions. On the workers’ side
constraint (2) is satisfied at the interior while constraint (5) is satisfied at the upper bound.
On the producers’ side constraint (2) is satisfied at the upper bound, while constraint (5) is
satisfied in the interior. Equality constraints (1), (3) and (4) clearly hold.
Equations (11)-(14) follow from (1) at the optimal choices of money holding while (19)
and (20) are restatements of (3) and (4) in equilibrium. If wjt /p
jj
t  f
′(l¯pj + lpjjt + l
pjk
t )
then cash-in-advance constraints are binding for producers in the labor market; hence lphht =
(mpht−1 + x
ph
t )/w
h
t and l
pff
t = ( m
pf
t−1 + x
pf
t )/w
f
t as in (15). Equality (6) is obtained from the
first order conditions (26)-(29) for producers. (9) and (10) are marginal rate of substitution
conditions for producers. Condition (vwf1 + v
wf
2 )− (v
wf
1 w
h
t )/w
f
t < 0 ensures that l
wfh
t = 0 by
the first-order condition (24) for each worker’s problem in country f , as in (16). Finally (7)
and (8) derive from the first-order conditions (21)-(25) for workers in the two countries.
(17) and (18) follow from the optimality conditions along with the money market clearing
condition (32). To see this, differentiate twice the lifetime utility of each agent i in country
j with respect to her money demand mijt . We have
∂Wwj/∂mwjt = γ
wj 1
qwjjt
(
−
1
pjjt
)
+ (1− γwj)
1
qwjkt
(
−
1
pjkt
)
< 0
and
∂2Wwj/∂(mwjt )
2 = −γwj
(
1
qwjjt
)2(
1
pjjt
)2
− (1− γwj)
(
1
qwjkt
)2(
1
pjkt
)2
< 0
for k = j. So, we must have mwht = m
wf
t = 0 as in (17). For producers, we have
∂W pj/∂mpjt = γ
pj η
j
qpjjt + ηh(m
pj
t /w
j
t )
1
wjt
> 0
and
∂2W pj/∂(mpjt )
2 = −γpj
(
ηj
qpjjt + η
h(mpjt /w
j
t )
)2
1
wjt
< 0.
So, we must have mpjt > 0. Thus, (18) is the unique money holding plan consistent with a
symmetric equilibrium.
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